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Trademarks as Keywords: For Sale or for Infringement? 
BY OLGA VODOLAZSCHI 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Over the last decade, the Internet has slowly been replacing the traditional way of 
a customer-salesperson shopping experience. Not long ago, computers were luxury items. 
But today, a computer or any electronic device is part of our daily routine. With just a 
few “searches” one can order online a hamburger delivery or buy a car.  
 But along with technological advances, legal concerns arise as well. A recent 
phenomenon that raises some legal questions is the keyword advertising, which is a way 
for companies to advertise with search engines.
1
 Advertisers purchase “keywords” so that 
ads appear next to search results after a consumer has typed these particular keywords.  
The legal question arises when for instance, Company A buys Company B’s (that is the 
direct competitor) trademark as a keyword. Is Company B entitled to sue Company A for 
trademark infringement? Is the claim actionable under the Lanham Act?  
This paper will start with an outline of the traditional framework of a trademark 
infringement claim, followed by the latest legal developments in light of the Internet 
phenomenon. Next, the article will focus on the seminal decisions from the Ninth Circuit 
that shed new light on the Internet trademark infringement analysis. The paper will also 
address the potential implications of the recent Ninth Circuit decisions on future Internet-
related trademark claims.  
 
 
 
                                                        
1 How Keywords Work, GOOGLE, 
http://support.google.com/adwords/bin/answer.py?hl=en&answer=1704371 (last visited Nov. 28, 2012).  
 2 
II. TRADEMARK LAW IN THE INTERNET WORLD 
Google, Bing and Yahoo are the three search engine pioneers of online 
commerce.
2
 Google, and more specifically its online advertising program AdWords, 
plays the main part in the Internet-related trademark infringement saga. It is a very 
popular tool that in 2011 brought over $36 billion in revenue.
3
 Google began its 
advertising tool based on keywords in 2000. The program started including trademarks as 
keywords in 2004.
4
 The architecture of a Google results page is of a particular interest for 
the discussion in this paper. Figure 1 is a screenshot of results when “ActiveBatch” 
trademark was used as a search term.  
Figure 1: Google Search for “ActiveBatch” 
 
                                                        
2 David J. Franklyn & David A. Hyman, Trademarks as Keywords: Much Ado About Something? (Univ. of 
S.F., Law Research Paper No. 2012-20, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2110364.  
3 2012 Financial Tables, GOOGLE, http://investor.google.com/financial/tables.html (last visited Nov. 28, 
2012).  
4 Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 2, at 10.  
Paid Results Auction Bidding 
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The screenshot above represents the disputed use of “ActiveBatch” trademark as a 
keyword in Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.,
5
 the seminal 
Ninth Circuit case discussed herein.
6
 As a prelude to the discussion of the case, the 
screenshot above illustrates the display of Network Automation’s website in the “Ads” 
section after searching for “ActiveBatch,” the trademark owned by Advanced Systems 
Concepts, Network Automation’s competitor.7 The links in the slightly shaded area above 
the natural results list are the paid results. Each of these links is there because the website 
won its position on Google search results page in an auction bidding.  
While AdWords tool is quite fruitful for Google, it might also be quite lucrative 
for lawyers in terms of legal ramifications. A client’s trademark, that is diligently 
guarded and policed, when used as a Google “keyword” helps competitors to divert the 
consumers from the client’s products. In response to searches of these keywords, Google 
provides “Sponsored Links” – competitors’ products ads.8 A question arises – is there 
enough legal ground to bring a claim for trademark infringement? 
But before jumping to the legal discussion, there are some real-world points worth 
mentioning. First, some trademark owners would not even bring a claim against their 
competitors, since probably most of the trademark owners are using the same strategy.
9
 
Priority for a company’s marketing team is revenue, rather than mark policing. This is the 
essence of the daily battle between marketing and legal teams within a company.  
                                                        
5 638 F.3d 1137, 1143 (9th Cir. 2011). 
6 See discussion infra Section III. 
7 See supra Figure 1.  
8 Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123, 125 (2d Cir. 2009) (“Advertisers pay Google based on the 
number of times Internet users “click” on the advertisement, so as to link to the advertiser’s website.”).  
9 Uli Widmaier, From Metatags to Sponsored Ads: The Evolution of the Internet-Related Trademark 
Infringement Doctrine, 4 LANDSLIDE 3 (2012).  
 4 
Second, AdWords is such an important advertising tool for many trademark 
owners that a claim for trademark infringement becomes of secondary importance.
10
 
While these two points might seem as an oversimplification of the matters, there is a need 
to bring more factors into the picture, such as the size of the potentially liable company, 
its recognition on the market and its litigation resources. What about a scenario where 
Company A brings a claim against Company B for trademark infringement, and at the 
same time engages itself in the same practice? The following example helps to illustrate 
the dilemma.  
In Rescuecom,
11
 a computer repair company brought a claim against Google for 
recommending the Rescuecom mark to its competitors as a search term for purchase. 
After the Second Circuit found “use in commerce,” and the case went back to trial court, 
Rescuecom abandoned its litigation.
12
 While fighting with Google over the use of 
Rescuecom mark, Rescuecom seemed to fight the opposite battle with Best Buy, which 
demanded Rescuecom to stop using “Geek Squad” as a keyword.13 Best Buy held “Geek 
Squad” mark for use in connection with computer repair services.14 Best Buy maintained 
a toll-free telephone number, 1-800-GEEK-SQU, which consumers could call for 
computer repair services.
15
  At the same time, Rescuecom also maintained a toll-free 
number, 1-800-GEEK-SQA, a misspelling of Best Buy’s trademark.16 In addition, 
                                                        
10 Widmaier, supra note 9.  
11 562 F.3d at 126.  
12 Eric Goldman, Rescuecom Abandons Its Litigation Against Google, Tech. & Mktg. L. Blog (Mar. 5, 2010, 
10:45 AM), http://blog.ericgoldman.org/archives/2010/03/rescuecom_aband.htm. 
13 Rescuecom Corp. v. BBY Solutions, Inc., No. 5:09-cv-01149-FJS-DEP (N.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 14, 2009). 
14 Id.  
15 Id.  
16 Id.  
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Rescuecom used the keyword phrase “geek squad” to display an advertisement for its 
computer repair services.
17
  
According to Eric Goldman, law professor and director of the High Tech Law 
Institute at Santa Clara University, “Rescuecom’s position in the lawsuit against Google 
is “intrinsically inconsistent” with its stance in the Best Buy litigation.”18 Gaming the 
issue on both sides would most probably not play well with the judges. Thus, companies 
should choose their battles and weigh the litigation costs and the probability of favorable 
outcome against the opponent.  
Internet trademark infringement issues surfaced only about a decade ago. To 
demonstrate infringement of a registered mark under the Lanham Act, which governs 
federal trademark infringement claims, a party must prove (1) that the alleged infringer 
“uses [the mark] in commerce”, and (2) such action or the use of such or some other 
subject “is likely to cause confusion” in the marketplace.19 Thus the question is whether 
use of a trademark as a keyword rises to the level of “use in commerce.”20  
The Second Circuit was the first to answer this question in the affirmative.
21
 In 
Rescuecom, a computer repair company alleged that “Google has recommended the 
Rescuecom trademark to its competitors as a search term to be purchased.”22 The court 
                                                        
17 Id.  
18 Wendy Davis, Rescuecom Geeks Out In Court After Victory Over Google, Media Post News (Jan. 20, 
2010, 6:54 PM), http://www.mediapost.com/publications/article/121008/#axzz2DG3jKP85. 
19 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or 
any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any combination 
thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact, which—(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the 
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, 
or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial activities by another person . . .”). 
20 Id.  
21 Rescuecom, 562 F.3d at 127.  
22 Id. at 126.  
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noted “Google displays, offers, and sells Rescuecom’s mark to Google’s advertising 
customers when selling its advertising services.”23  
Thus “Google’s utilization of Rescuecom’s mark fits literally within” Lanham 
Act’s definition of “use of commerce.”24 The court concluded that Google “used 
[Rescuecom’s mark] in the sale or advertising of services and the services . . . rendered in 
commerce.”25  
“Use in commerce” is not enough though. The crux of a trademark infringement 
claim is proving the second prong, likelihood of confusion. On one hand, the technology 
is advancing on the sophistication ladder: from metatags to domain names to keyword 
advertising. On the other hand, the question is whether it is even worth for trademark 
owners to engage in a long battle against Google or its competitors.  
 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT – THE “HOMELAND” OF LEGAL BREAKTHROUGHS 
(a) Brookfield Communications, Inc. v. West Coast Entertainment Corp.
26
 
The Brookfield case is the Ninth Circuit decision that laid the foundation for the 
Internet trademark law, specifically domain names and metatags.
27
 
The plaintiff ran a “computer software featuring a searchable database containing 
entertainment-industry related information marketed under the “MovieBuff” mark.28 The 
                                                        
23 Id. at 129.  
24 Id. at 129; 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).  
25 Id.  
26 174 F.3d 1036 (9th Cir. 1999).  
27 Widmaier, supra note 9; Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1045 (“Metatags are HTML code intended to describe 
the contents of the web site. There are different types of metatags, but those of principal concern to us are 
the “description” and “keyword” metatags. . . . The more often a term appears in the metatags and in the 
text of the web page, the more likely it is that the web page will be “hit” in a search for that keyword and 
the higher of the list of “hits” the web page will appear.”).  
28 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1041. 
 7 
defendant registered a domain name “moviebuff.com”, allegedly plaintiff’s registered 
mark.
29
  
When it comes to the second element of a trademark infringement claim, there is 
little uniformity among circuits on the analysis of likelihood of confusion. Even though 
the actual factors for likelihood of confusion are mainly the same, each circuit has its own 
version.  
The Ninth Circuit follows the Sleekcraft test.
30
 When first facing questions of 
trademark infringement in the Internet context, the Brookfield court noted that the “eight-
factor test for likelihood of confusion is pliant.”31 Even over a decade ago, the court 
believed that there is need for an “ acute aware[ness] of excessive rigidity when applying 
the law in the Internet context; emerging technologies required a flexible approach.”32 
The court warned against “simply launching into a mechanical application of the eight-
factor Sleekcraft test.”33 
To establish whether the defendant used plaintiff’s trademark in the domain name, 
the Brookfield court simplified the analysis of likelihood of confusion using only three 
out of the traditional eight Sleekraft factors: “(1) the virtual identity of marks, (2) the 
relatedness of plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods, and (3) the simultaneous use of the Web 
                                                        
29 Id. at 1042.  
30 AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit test for likelihood 
of confusion consists of eight factors: (1) strength of the mark; (2) proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of 
the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5) marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree 
of care likely to be exercised by the purchaser; (7) defendant’s intent in selecting the mark; and (8) 
likelihood of expansion of the product lines.  
31 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054. 
32 Id.  
33 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1146. 
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as a marketing channel.”34 With fewer factors, it seemed easier to prove trademark 
infringement.  
In addition to presenting a new standard in Internet-related cases, “Brookfield was 
the first to present a claim of initial interest confusion on the Internet.”35 In addition to 
using plaintiff’s mark in defendant’s domain name, plaintiff alleged use of its mark in the 
HTML code of defendant’s site.36  
The court noted that “[u]sing another’s trademark in one’s metatags is much like 
posting a sign with another’s trademark in front of one’s store. . . . Customers are not 
confused in the narrow sense: they are fully aware that they are purchasing from [a 
competitor of a trademark owner] and they have no reason to believe that [the 
competitor] is related to, or in any way sponsored by, [the trademark owner].”37 Under 
this scenario, the competitor is still acquiring the goodwill of the trademark owner.
38
  
The court concluded “that consumer confusion was likely, particularly given the 
nature of consumers at issue, who included casual movie watchers unlikely to realize that 
they had mistakenly clicked on to West Coast’s site when they had intended to reach 
Brookfield’s” site.39 In Brookfield, the initial interest confusion replaced the traditional 
likelihood of confusion analysis that did not hold in that case.  
                                                        
34 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 n.16. 
35 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148; Grotrian, Helfferich, Schulz, Th. Steinweg Nachf v. Steinway and 
Sons, 523 F.2d 1331, 1341-42 (2d Cir. 1975). Steinweg and Steinway were competitors in the pianos 
business. Id. Potential customers could rely on the reputation acquired by Steinway and “think that there is 
some connection between the Grotrian-Steinweg and Steinway pianos.” Id. at 1342.  
36 174 F.3d at 1061.  
37 Id. at 1064. 
38 Id.  
39 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1146. 
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In metatags analysis, the court also found initial interest confusion in using 
MovieBuff in the HTML code of the defendant’s website.40 The consumers were directed 
to the defendant’s website through an invisible to them use of the plaintiff’s mark, thus 
leading to initial interest confusion. When a consumer searched for “MovieBuff” the list 
would include both MovieBuff and West Coast websites.
41
 Since they were prominently 
displayed, when a consumer clicked on West Coast (that used MoviedBuff in its 
metatags) she was aware of the page she was visiting.  
There was initial interest confusion in metatags analysis “by using Brookfield’s 
mark MovieBuff to direct persons searching for Brookfield’s product to the West Coast 
site [that] derived an improper benefit from the goodwill Brookfield developed.”42  
 
(b) Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Netscape Communications Corp.
43
  
While the role of metatags faded away, the Brookfield analysis held up in another 
Ninth Circuit case dealing with keywords.
44
 In dispute were the banner ads (not clearly 
labeled) linked to consumers’ search of plaintiff’s marks such as “playboy” and 
“playmate”.45 Defendant Netscape offered a version of a keyword advertising program 
and sold lists of terms to sponsors that if searched would display the sponsor’s 
advertisement on the result page.
46
 “Playboy” was among more that 400 terms on one of 
                                                        
40 Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1061. 
41 Id.  
42 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1146. 
43 354 F.3d 1020 (9th Cir. 2004).  
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 1022.  
46 Id.  
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such lists.
47
 The court reasoned that such practice was quite similar to the use of metatags 
in the Brookfield case and found initial interest confusion.  
Applying the Brookfield three-part test, plaintiff’s mark was strong, the parties’ 
services were both in the adult entertainment business, and both parties used Internet as 
their marketing channel. The court analyzed the nature of goods and consumers and 
concluded that “the average searcher seeking adult-oriented materials on the Internet is 
easily diverted from a specific product he or she is seeking if other options, particularly 
graphic ones, appear more quickly.”48 Consumers were easily diverted to other 
competitors’ websites following the linked banner advertisements that were “unlabeled” 
and thus misled them into believing a Playboy affiliation.
49
  
Of particular importance was the concurrence of Judge Marsha Berzon who raised 
a question of whether the consumer was confused by the practices applied in Brookfield 
and Playboy, or rather presented with a clear choice.
50
 In Brookfield, even though the 
defendant used the plaintiff’s mark of MovieBuff as a metatag for its website 
westcoastvideo.com, “[c]onsumers were free to choose the official moviebuff.com 
website [among all other search results] and were not hijacked or misdirected 
elsewhere.”51 In contrast, the Playboy decision applied to “situations in which the banner 
advertisements are not labeled or identified.”52  
 
                                                        
47 Id. at 1023.  
48 Id. at 1031.  
49 Id. at 1025.  
50 Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1034 (Berzon, J., concurring).  
51 Id. at 1036.  
52 Id.  
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If there is a cheaper and more accessible or desirable product, why not “suggest” 
it to consumers? After all, the Lanham Act protects not only intellectual property but also 
consumers who should be offered options and be allowed to choose. As long as 
consumers are faced with clear choices, rather than being diverted from one website to 
another using a competitor’s trademark, there should be no legal concerns.  
 
(c) Network Automation, Inc. v. Advanced Systems Concepts, Inc.
53
 
With Internet entering more and more households and with consumers getting 
rather sophisticated, the recent Ninth Circuit decision came just in time to announce a 
new standard for the analysis of Internet-related trademark infringement claims.
54
  
The court noted that it “did not intend Brookfield to be read so expansively as to 
forever enshrine these three factors – now often referred to as the “Internet trinity” or 
“Internet troika” – as the test for trademark infringement on the Internet.”55 In Network 
Automation, the two parties were direct competitors in the job scheduling software 
market.
56
 Network advertised its software by purchasing such keyword as “ActiveBatch” 
which was the other party’s registered trademark.57 A consumer, entering such a 
keyword, would “produce a results page showing “www.NetworkAutomation.com” as a 
sponsored link, above the natural results list.
58
  
The Internet scene has changed significantly since 1999, the year of the 
Brookfield decision. Thus, “it makes no sense to prioritize the same three factors for 
                                                        
53 638 F.3d 1137 (9th Cir. 2011).  
54 Id. at 1154.  
55 Id. at 1148. 
56 Id. at 1142.  
57 Id.  
58 Id.  
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every type of potential online commercial activity.”59 The court stated that “[d]epending 
on the facts of each specific case arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as 
more illuminating on the question of consumer confusion.”60 Taking into account the 
technological breakthroughs in the Internet arena since the Brookfield decision, “[t]he 
“troika” is a particularly poor fit for the question presented here.”61  
For instance, Brookfield third factor, simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing 
channel, is quite irrelevant today.
62
 Every company seems to turn to the services of the 
Web for its business promotion and customer expansion. In the era of Internet, “it would 
be the rare commercial retailer that did not advertise online, and the shared use of a 
ubiquitous marketing channel does not shed much light on the likelihood of consumer 
confusion.”63  
The Ninth Circuit turned to the Sleekcraft factors, its version of likelihood of 
confusion analysis.
64
 Ultimately, in the analysis of the keyword advertising trademark 
infringement, the Ninth Circuit stated that “the most relevant factors to the analysis of the 
likelihood of confusion are: (1) the strength of the mark; (2) the evidence of actual 
confusion; (3) the type of goods and degree of care likely to be exercised by the 
purchaser; and (4) the labeling and appearance of the advertisements and the surrounding 
context on the screen displaying the results page.”65  
Of particular interest is the new fourth factor that the court brought into the 
analysis of Internet-related trademark infringement claims. The proper partition of 
                                                        
59 Id. at 1148.  
60 Id.  
61 Id.  
62 Id. at 1151; Brookfield, 174 F.3d at 1054 n.16. 
63 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1151.  
64 Id. at 1149.  
65 Id. at 1154.  
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“search results pages so that the advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for 
“sponsored” links” seemed to be the deciding factor in the court’s decision.   
The change of heart in the analysis of Internet-related cases has to do a lot with 
the way consumers started treating and perceiving the Internet.  Today Internet is part of 
our daily routine. If before, consumers could be confused between who is the owner of a 
website and of a banner ad, today “the court assumes that Internet users are thoroughly 
experienced using search engines, including distinguishing between natural and 
sponsored search results.”66  
Going forward “[t]he appearance of the advertisements and their surrounding 
context on the user’s screen” are factors to take into account when analyzing keyword 
advertising cases.
67
 Thus, “Google and Bing have partitioned their search results pages so 
that the advertisements appear in separately labeled sections for “sponsored” links.”68 In 
other words, the court believed that a consumer searching for “ActiveBatch” would first 
be looking within the primary natural search results and not within “sponsored links,” 
secondary search results that would display Network’s website. 
Prominent display and assumption of consumer sophistication is what saved the 
defendant from the trademark infringement claim. It would seem then that today’s 
technologically savvy and Internet dependent consumer would always be capable of 
avoiding confusion in the courts’ eyes since “[c]learly labeling the source of the 
                                                        
66 Widmaier, supra note 9. 
67 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1154. 
68 Id.  
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competing product in Internet advertising will go a long way toward protecting the 
advertiser from a claim of trademark infringement.”69  
 With the Ninth Circuit being the homeland of the Silicon Valley and therefore of 
the majority of technological breakthroughs, no wonder that it provides other circuits 
with revised analyses in Internet-related issues.  
The Ninth Circuit seems to stand for “flexibility” in the analysis of Internet-
related trademark infringement claims. While Network Automation is a reformist 
decision, it is nevertheless troubling. The court claimed that Brookfield analysis should 
not be “forever enshrine[d]” and that “[d]epending on the facts of each specific case 
arising on the Internet, other factors may emerge as more illuminating on the question of 
consumer confusion.”70 Though the court moved away from the Brookfield test, it did not 
discard it completely. Therefore, the troubling question is what test should the courts use 
in future Internet-related cases?  
 While the Ninth Circuit did not openly overrule the Brookfield analysis, the 
decision seems obsolete enough for our century. First, the Network Automation court 
discussed today’s irrelevance of the third element of the test, the simultaneous use of the 
Web as a marketing channel.
71
 Second, the Brookfield element of relatedness of 
plaintiff’s and defendant’s goods seems quite irrelevant as well. A company would be 
interested in buying another trademark as a keyword only if the services or products are 
related enough for the consumers to be easily tempted to make the switch. Relatedness of 
                                                        
69 Lisa Dejaco, Internet Advertising: Two Competitors, One Trademark, THE FEDERAL LAWYER, IP Insight, 
May 2011.  
70 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148.  
71 See supra p. 7.  
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goods would facilitate consumers to be “likely confused” or “initial interest confused” to 
prefer a competing product.  
 Going forward, the best approach seems to examine the Sleekcraft factors (or the 
equivalent in the appropriate circuit) and whatever “other factors may emerge as more 
illuminating on the question of consumer confusion.”72 For instance, Network Automation 
introduced a novel fourth factor discussed above, “the labeling and appearance of the 
advertisements and the surrounding context on the screen displaying the results page.”73 
Overall, the Ninth Circuit opened the door to “flexibility” in future case-by-case analyses 
of Internet-related trademark infringement claims.  
 
(d) Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. v. Tabari
74
 
The Ninth Circuit has also recently addressed the question of using competitor’s 
trademark in domain names.
75
 In Tabari, the defendant operated an online dealership 
through “buy-a-lexus.com” and “buyorleaselexus.com.”76 The question was whether the 
use of “lexus” in the domain name would cause confusion as to the source of the 
defendant’s website.77  
 Once again, the refinement of consumers came to the defendant’s rescue since 
“[c]onsumers who use the internet for shopping are generally quite sophisticated . . . and 
won’t be fooled into thinking that the prestigious German car manufacturer sells boots at 
mercedesboots.com, or homes at mercedeshomes.com . . . .”78 Usually, “[w]hen a domain 
                                                        
72 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148. 
73 Id. at 1154.  
74 610 F.3d 1171 (2010).  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 1174.  
77 Id.  
78 Id. at 1178.  
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name consists only of the trademark followed by .com, or some other suffix like .org or 
.net, it will typically suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the trademark holder.”79 
Under Tabari, a defendant’s use of a trademark combined with other words in the domain 
name constitutes nominative fair use and does not rise to infringement.
80
 The traditional 
Sleekcraft analysis does not apply in cases “where a defendant uses the mark to refer to 
the trademarked good itself.”81 Here, the Tabaris were “using the term Lexus to describe 
their business of brokering Lexus automobiles.”82 Since the Tabaris needed to make their 
business known to the consumers it was “nearly impossible to do without mentioning 
Lexus, be it via domain name, metatag, radio jingle, telephone solicitation or blimp.”83  
 In Tabari, as well as in the subsequent Network Automation case, the Ninth 
Circuit put the decision-making in the hands of consumers, believing that “prudent and 
experienced internet consumers are accustomed to such exploration by trial and error” 
and therefore “don’t form any firm expectations about the sponsorship of a website until 
they’ve seen the landing page – if then.”84  
 Both Ninth Circuit seminal cases, Network Automation and Tabari are premised 
on today’s understanding that consumers are highly sophisticated to be “fooled” by 
                                                        
79 Id. at 1177.  
80 Id. at 1175-76. (“In cases where a nominative fair use defense is raised, we ask whether (1) the product 
was “readily identifiable” without use of the mark; (2) defendant used more of the mark than necessary; or 
(3) defendant falsely suggested he was sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder . . . . This test [is] 
designed to address the risk that nominative use of the mark will inspire a mistaken belief on the part of 
consumers that the speaker is sponsored or endorsed by the trademark holder. The third factor speaks 
directly to the risk of such confusion and the others do so indirectly: Consumers may reasonably infer 
sponsorship or endorsement if a company uses an unnecessary trademark or “more” of a mark than 
necessary.”) (citing New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ’g, Inc., 971 F.2d 302, 308-309 (9th Cir. 
1992)).  
81 Id. at 1175.  
82 Id. at 1175.  
83 Id. at 1181.  
84 Id. at 1179. 
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domain names, sponsored links or any other marketing tricks companies might have. The 
idea that the Internet is innovative is long gone.   
 A recent case from the Third Circuit has already followed in the footsteps of the 
Ninth Circuit analysis.
85
 The case involved two companies that provided web research 
services to college students who consider transferring.
86
 The plaintiff, AcademyOne, 
purchased the defendant’s trademark in Google AdWords.87 Though the Third Circuit has 
its own version of the likelihood of confusion factors, known as the Lapp factors,
88
 the 
CollegeSource court decided to “place emphasis on the four factors noted in Network 
Automation”89 in addition to the traditional analysis.   
In CollegeSource, the defendant offered evidence of actual confusion factor. It 
was sparse since “there have only been 65 instances [over one month] in which Internet 
users searched for CollegeSource, [and] were presented with AcademyOne’s 
advertisements, and clicked to AcademyOne’s website.”90 The court also analyzed the 
labeling ad appearance of the advertisements Network Automation factor.
91
 The court 
emphasized the display of AcademyOne’s advertisements “presented in separate sections 
of the search results [and] especially the clearly differentiated text boxes and the fact that 
CollegeSource’s name does not appear within the language of the advertisement.”92  
 Again, the court relied heavily on the sophistication of consumers. The 
CollegeSource court reasoned that “consumers seeking to obtain transfer information are 
                                                        
85 CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., No. 10-3542, 2012 WL 5269213 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 25, 2012).  
86 Id. at *1.  
87 Id. at *5.  
88 Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460 (3rd Cir. 1983). 
89 CollegeSource, 2012 WL 5269213 at *16.  
90 Id. at *17.  
91 Id. at *18.  
92 Id.  
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likely to practice diligence in their research” and thus “are not likely to be confused by 
Internet advertising.”93 
 The Third Circuit did not just take for granted the sophistication of the 21
st
 
century consumer proclaimed by the Ninth Circuit. Rather, while emphasizing the four 
Network Automation factors, the CollegeSource court took into account the nature of the 
market (i.e. decision-making resources for college transfers) and the type of consumer 
(i.e. college students diligent in their research).  
 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT JUDICIAL ASSUMPTIONS 
 Analyzing the above Ninth Circuit decisions, it seems that there are a series of 
assumptions standing behind the judicial reasoning. As already discussed, the crucial 
assumption in Network Automation and Tabari cases is the sophistication of today’s 
consumer. While I would like to believe that all of the technological advances caught up 
with each consumer, there is a degree of skepticism as to consumers’ sophistication 
across the board. Are we all able to distinguish the “paid ads” from the organic search 
results on Google page? The Tabari court pointed out that there should be no trouble for 
a consumer to differentiate among lexus.com, a Lexus sponsored website, and  
mercedesboots.com, a website clearly not affiliated with the German manufacturer 
Mercedes.
94
 
                                                        
93 Id. at *18-19.  
94 Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1178 (“Consumers who use the internet for shopping … won’t be fooled into 
thinking that the prestigious German car manufacturer sells boots at mercedesboots.com, or homes at 
mercedeshomes.com, or that comcastsucks.org is sponsored or endorsed by the TV cable company just 
because the string of letters making up its trademark appears in the domain.”).  
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 Another question that the Ninth Circuit does not seem to ponder over is consumer 
goals and expectations. It does not take into account that consumers could have different 
expectations when typing in a trademark as a keyword. Is the consumer typing “Nike” in  
Google search box with a purpose to specifically find Nike sports apparel, or is the search 
a proxy for sports attire and the consumer is potentially interested in such brands as 
Puma, Adidas or New Balance? It seems logical that in the case of a consumer with a 
focused search (i.e. looking specifically for “Nike” sports apparel) she would be more 
prone to likelihood of confusion, rather than a consumer having an expansive goal of 
simply exploring sports apparel under a chosen proxy brand such as “Nike.”  
 In order for the courts to have reached the decisions discussed above, the Ninth 
Circuit had to assume that if a consumer is typing trademark A, she is only looking for 
products or services under mark A. This is quite a sweeping assumption, assuming that 
courts are dealing with the sophisticated consumer that the Ninth Circuit proclaimed is 
able to explore by “trial and error.”95  
Thus, the consumer in the Playboy case, searching for “playmate” or “playboy” 
might as well be using these marks as search words for a generalization of adult-oriented 
content, rather than for specifically Playboy sponsored materials. Under such 
circumstances, there could hardly be any initial interest confusion. Often, consumers are 
typing a trademark as a search word because that particular mark is a famous one that 
comes first to mind and could lead to similar products and services.  
 According to a survey led by two law professors, “consumers may use trademarks 
as a generic reference for some categories of goods and services (i.e. Hertz = rental cars), 
                                                        
95 Id. at 1179.  
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and use trademarks to search for specific products for other categories of goods and 
services (i.e. Macbook = Apple computers).”96 A simple blanket assumption of  
consumers’ goals and expectations seems too broad of a generalization. Again, it is quite 
troubling taking into account that the Ninth Circuit is elevating the consumer to a high 
level of sophistication and technological familiarity.   
 
V. THE 21ST CENTURY SOPHISTICATED CONSUMER 
 The Ninth Circuit is making a generalization in terms “that the default degree of 
consumer care is becoming more heightened as the novelty of the Internet evaporates and 
online commerce becomes commonplace.”97 Today’s modern consumer is used to 
“exploration by trail and error” and is ready to “skip from site to site, ready to hit the 
back button whenever they’re not satisfied with a site’s contents.”98  
 Drawing a parallel across the four Ninth Circuit cases discussed above, it seems 
that the important factor is not the increasing sophistication of an Internet browser, but 
rather the nature of the business and of the consumer searching for products within the 
particular niche of the online marketplace.  
In Brookfield, the court dealt with “casual movie watchers unlikely to realize that 
they had mistakenly clicked on to [a competitor’s] site when they had intended to reach 
[plaintiff’s’]” site.99  
                                                        
96 Franklyn & Hyman, supra note 2, at 19. 
97 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1152.  
98 Id. at 1179.  
99 174 F.3d at 1146.  
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In Playboy, the court was looking at a “searcher seeking adult-oriented materials 
on the Internet” who would be “easily diverted […] if other products, particularly graphic 
ones, appear more quickly.”100  
In Tabari, the consumer was “a reasonably prudent consumer […] shopping for 
an expensive product like a luxury car.”101 In terms of the nature of goods, a consumer 
searching for a Lexus would probably never be subjected to initial interest confusion 
visiting any site other than lexus.com [such as buy-a-lexus.com or buyorleaselexus.com] 
and believe that it is a Lexus-sponsored site. “Because the official Lexus site is almost 
certain to be found at lexus.com, it’s far less likely to be found at other sites containing 
the word Lexus.”102  
Network Automation is the case where the Ninth Circuit gave unlimited decision-
making power to the consumers and simply stated that “[t]hey fully expect to find some 
sites that aren’t what they imagine based on a glance at the domain name or search engine 
summary.”103 The consumers of the 21st century “don’t form any firm expectations about 
the sponsorship of a website until they’ve seen the landing page – if then.”104  
On the other hand, initial confusion is highly probable to affect particular 
consumers looking for certain types of products and services, such as movie watchers 
looking for Hollywood gossip and movie reviews
105
 and adult entertainment consumers 
looking for graphic materials.
106
 If similar products are offered somewhere else, diversion 
towards competitors’ sites can occur.  
                                                        
100 354 F.3d at 1028.  
101 610 F.3d at 1176. 
102 Id. at 1178.  
103 638 F.3d at 1152-53. 
104 Id. at 1153.  
105 See Brookfield, 174 F.2d at 1036.  
106 See Playboy, 354 F.3d at 1020.  
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 For instance, in Geico, a Fourth Circuit case, the plaintiff GEICO pointed to “the 
unique nature of the car insurance business [and] contend[ed] that because customers 
seek an average of fewer than two quotes before purchasing car insurance, even in the  
Internet context the company loses significant business from the alleged initial confusion 
that misdirects potential customers who originally searched on “GEICO” to sites where 
they can obtain other companies' quotes but not GEICO's.”107 Depending on the 
consumer and the product searched for, the question of consumer diversion should be 
treated differently.  
Instead of trusting the consumer to make the choice only because she is a 
sophisticated 21
st
 century browser, I believe the crucial inquiry should take into account 
the nature of the products and goods that are the subject of an alleged trademark 
infringement claim, the goals and expectations of the consumer, the specificity of market 
in discussion and the ultimate goal that the consumer wishes to attain, whether it is 
buying a luxury good or accessing some routine product or service.  
 
VI. ADWORDS – BENEFICIAL TOOL FOR INTERNATIONAL TRADE?  
Technology travels across country borders and oceans. While trademark owners 
are policing their marks, and courts are implementing new tests for the Internet-related 
trademark infringement claims, AdWords tool can potentially benefit international 
trade.
108
 Firms with limited capabilities can forego direct marketing (i.e. TV 
commercials, ad campaigns, etc.) in targeted countries and simply resort to AdWords tool 
that will provide worldwide coverage as long as there is access to computers.   
                                                        
107 Gov't Employees Ins. Co. v. Google, Inc., 1:04CV507, 2005 WL 1903128 (E.D. Va. Aug. 8, 2005). 
108 Ashley Tan, Google AdWords: Trademark Infringer or Trade Liberalizer?, 16 MICH. TELECOMM & 
TECH L. REV. 473, 502 (2010).  
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It seems that “AdWords facilitates the free flow of international trade and 
commerce in a way that a state-based trade policy cannot.”109 Among the advantages of 
such strategy are low costs to AdWords account holders, access to an expansive audience 
and little intervention from national governments.
110
 
This scheme that is beneficial to certain companies and to a large number of 
consumers goes against the interests of the holders of those trademarks that are being 
used as keywords. Trademark owners are making the same assumption as the courts did 
in the Ninth Circuit,
111
 specifically dismissing the fact that “consumers entering a search 
query containing a trademarked term are often not looking for the exact match to, for 
example, the trademark holder’s website. Instead they not only expect to see, but also 
want to see search results that include links to competitors’ websites.”112  
Assuming consumers are looking for one specific product bearing the trademark 
used as a keyword, consumers would have to undergo extensive on-line searches in order 
to gather an extensive survey of competitors. Otherwise, their search results will not 
contain the trademark holder’s ads. “If they never view the competitor’s ads, they will 
have much less awareness that such competitors exist.”113 Restriction on use of keywords 
would constrain freedom of choice and trade. Consumers would be limited to local and 
recognized marks and not allow competitors of the trademark owners to market 
themselves.  
                                                        
109 Id.  
110 Id. at 503.  
111 See supra Section IV.  
112 Tan, supra note 98, at 505. 
113 Id.  
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AdWords seems to encourage competition by allowing the consumer to be the 
decision-maker. The ability to pick and choose by “trial and error”114 is within the 
capabilities of the 21
st
 century sophisticated consumer.  
The reality of today’s economy is that competitors have to battle for their market 
share and for their consumers. How is Google AdWords tool different from the 
traditional advertising campaigns? Companies resort to marketing to come up with the 
“winner” strategy to stand out among competitors and also protect their marks from 
becoming generic and unprotected.
115
 In Google’s world, trademark owners can stand out 
by buying their own trademarks, “an equivalent effort to ensure continued association 
with their marks in the eyes of consumers.”116 Looking at this issue from a purely 
economic standpoint, AdWords is an advantage for international trade.  
Trademark owners though are looking at the issue from a purely trademark 
infringement angle and overlook the potential benefit of AdWords for the market 
competition. AdWords can potentially help small companies achieve some recognition 
and break into the market. At the same time, the established market participants worry 
that the new entrants might get a free-ride on the their reputation by diverting consumers 
through the AdWords tool.  
This is a battle that will be a recurring issue in a world driven by technology. 
Acknowledging that Internet-related trademark analysis had to move forward, the Ninth 
Circuit stated that the Brookfield decision became obsolete.
117
 While not openly 
                                                        
114 Tabari, 610 F.3d at 1179.  
115 Tan, supra note 98, at 506.  
116 Id.  
117 Network Automation, 638 F.3d at 1148. 
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overruling the Brookfield court, the Ninth Circuit advocated for flexibility and for taking 
into account relevant factors to each case.  
Therefore, as the sophisticated consumer becomes more knowledgeable and the 
technology more evolved, courts should include new factors in the trademark 
infringement analysis. In addition, courts should always consider the nature of products 
or services in dispute, the goals and expectations of consumers and the reputation and 
market share of competitors.   
 
  
